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India’s World Interview with Dr. Oleksandr Polishchuk, Ambassador of Ukraine to the Republic of India

New Delhi, February 25, 2025

Russia seems to be achieving its minimal objectives in this war, securing Donbas, Crimea, and the land bridge. How does Ukraine plan to regain momentum and convince its international partners that it can win the war? 

- In February 2022, Russia planned to capture Kyiv within three days, eliminate the President and government, and thus establish control over the country. Yet, for three long years, the heroic Ukrainian people have proven to the entire world that, contrary to Putin’s claims, the Ukrainian state exists and will continue to exist. By May 2022, the Kremlin had already suffered political defeat in this war. Its military alliance with the authoritarian regimes of Belarus, North Korea, and Iran only underscores Russia’s military ineptitude and cements its status as a political “pariah” and terrorist state. 

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian armed forces continue military operations in Russia’s Kursk region. Their goal is to create a buffer zone that will reduce the ability of Russia to carry out strikes on the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine’s northern regions. 

Our allies and partners are democratic countries. We are united by common democratic values. Ukraine is one of the 51 founding members of the UN. The Ukrainian delegation actively participated in the San Francisco Conference and played a key role in coordinating the drafting of the Preamble, as well as the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter.

Restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, including territorial waters, complies with the UN Charter and international law. These principles have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the UNGA. Their adherence is equally important for both Ukraine and India. Violations of these principles must be held accountable, regardless of a country’s status. And accountability will inevitably come for Russia for waging an aggressive war against a founding member of the UN.

The war has transitioned into an attritional struggle, with Russia making slow progress at a high cost. How is Ukraine adapting its military tactics to counter Russia’s approach, particularly considering the impact of Western-supplied weapons like HIMARS?

This war could have ended long ago if Ukraine had received enough modern weapons at critical turning points. Just as in March 2022, when Ukrainians crushed and expelled Russian strike groups headed towards Kyiv. Or in September 2022, during a counteroffensive operation in the Kharkiv region. Or in November 2022, during liberation of the right-bank of Kherson region and city of Kherson. 

The strategy chosen by Ukraine is clear to everyone – the de-occupation of all Ukrainian territories. It is no different from India’s strategy towards its territories occupied by others.

Tactics are always determined by means of warfare. It wasn’t just HIMARS that became game changers. Shortage of artillery shells triggered a boom in the use of kamikaze drones. As a result, Russia’s advantage in artillery numbers was practically nullified.

Delays in the supply of long-range strike systems by partners led to a rapid increase in Ukraine’s production of missiles and strike drones. Today, Ukraine has the capability to strike military targets deep within Russia’s European territory. The gradual build-up of Ukraine’s Air Force with modern Western aircraft will soon deprive the enemy of its superiority in the sky. 

All I mentioned has led to high irreversible losses for the enemy – more than 1,000 soldiers per day. As a result, the pace of Russian military advances has signifi cantly slowed compared to October 2024 and now more closely resembles positional warfare rather than the rapid offensive manoeuvres of mechanised forces. 

For Ukraine, this means that favourable conditions may soon emerge for the defeat of advancing enemy groups.

Do you think the West and the US could have done more to help Ukraine in this war? 

Logically, as a country that is 25 times smaller than the aggressor, we anticipate and count on greater support from our partners. Under current circumstances, there can be no talk of “business as usual” with the aggressor. More political pressure and isolation of the Kremlin regime should be imposed. More stringent economic sanctions. This is what President Trump calls a policy of strength. In the UN terminology, it is called peace enforcement. Russia must be forced to comply with the UN Charter. 

Of course, you may object, reminding me that for this, the approval of the UN Security Council is needed, which cannot be achieved due to Russia’s veto. But this is precisely where the idea of the UN reform comes in — to adapt rules to the demands of the present. For instance, if we consider giving the UNGA the prerogative (centuria praerogativa) to make decisions over those of the UNSC. However, such reform requires not only the determination of the majority of the UN members but also the willingness of the UN leadership to accept such revolutionary changes.

I would like to remind you that in the “Pact for the Future,” adopted on September 22, 2024, at the UNGA, our leaders agreed to reform the UNSC to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable. 

By the way, Russia opposed the adoption of this document. 

I hope that India, which seeks a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, can be at the forefront of these processes and prove once again its right to world leadership.

Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has raised concerns about the future of US support for Ukraine. How confident are you in maintaining bipartisan support in the US Congress, and what message do you have for those who advocate for a negotiated settlement that might involve territorial concessions?

I would like to quote a highly respected diplomat, who is undoubtedly internationally recognised: “Nor must we countenance that political convenience determines responses to terrorism, extremism and violence. Similarly, respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs cannot be exercised in cherry-picking. When reality departs from rhetoric, we must have the courage to call it out. Without genuine solidarity, there can never be real trust”. 

This is a quote from the speech by India’s Minister of External Affairs, Dr. S. Jaishankar, at the 78th UNGA in September 2023. In his speech at the 79th UNGA, he expanded on this thought: “A dysfunctional nation coveting the lands of others must be exposed and must be countered”. I couldn’t have expressed it better, and I can assure you that Ukraine fully shares this position.

Ukraine aspires to join both the EU and NATO, which will not be easy, it seems. But there are other models being suggested. Considering the various security guarantee models proposed, such as the ‘porcupine,’ ‘Korean,’ and ‘West German’ models, which approach aligns best with Ukraine’s long-term security goals and its vision for integration with the Euro-Atlantic community?

The principle of analogy or the rule of precedent are not applicable in this situation. Ukraine cannot afford, like India, to be in a negotiation process over territorial concessions for 60 years. About 1.3% of India’s territory is under occupation, primarily in high-altitude regions. In contrast, by my calculations, Russia occupies approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Attempts to diplomatically resolve territorial disputes between Ukraine and Russia within the Normandy Format and Minsk Agreements ended with the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

Only NATO membership or the return of tactical nuclear weapons can ensure Ukraine’s military security without violating its sovereignty. The country’s economic security will be ensured by the EU membership. These integration processes are enshrined in our Constitution.

There have been discussions about potentially developing nuclear weapons. What is your take on that? 

Let’s operate with international legal norms. In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In exchange, Ukraine received a legally insignifi cant Budapest Memorandum on “security assurances” from Russia, the US, and the UK. In 2014, Russia occupied Ukraine’s Crimea, violating this agreement. The other signatories of the Memorandum did not react to this violation as the Memorandum had not foreseen such a response, despite Ukraine’s appeals. 

Therefore, the skill of “reaching an agreement” must be supported by the skill of “honouring the agreement”; otherwise, it is worthless. 

Article X of the NPT allows a country to withdraw from the Treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country.” Article IX of the NPT states, “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.”

In this regard, I would like to recall that in 1940, it was at the Ukrainian Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology where a team of scientists, including Friedrich Lange, Volodymyr Shpinel, and Viktor Maslov, developed the fi rst nuclear bomb project in the USSR. In 1932, the Institute achieved the first nuclear fission of lithium in the USSR.

Based on this, Ukraine legally has a formal right to develop its own nuclear weapons. India and Ukraine have a history of cooperation in various fields. How has the war impacted this relationship, and what specific steps can India take to enhance bilateral ties and contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts? 

Ukrainian-Indian cooperation before the war was multifaceted. Annual trade turnover reached up to $5 billion. Ukraine was the largest supplier of sunflower oil to India. Over 22,000 students from India, mostly medical, studied in Ukraine. More than 150 combat ships of the Indian Navy are equipped with gas turbines produced in Ukraine. After the visit of the Prime Minister of India to Ukraine in August 2024, we agreed to elevate bilateral cooperation to the level of strategic partnership. Clear plans for the implementation of this decision have been developed. Together, we are working diligently on this task.

While India has provided humanitarian assistance, some believe it could play a more active role in promoting a peaceful resolution. How do you view India’s current position on the war, and what are your expectations for India’s future engagement in this conflict, considering its complex relationship with Russia and reliance on both Russian and Ukrainian military technology? 

Partially, I have already answered this question. Therefore, I will only mention that today, India aims to take a leading position in the world, declares itself as the voice of the “Global South,” and has ambitions to secure a permanent seat in the UNSC.

During a recent visit to the United States, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, when discussing the Russia-Ukraine war with President Donald Trump, stated that “India has not been neutral. In fact, India has been on the side of peace”. Now, we count on practical steps from India’s leadership to achieve peace in Ukraine.

On a personal level, how has this war impacted your perspective on international relations, diplomacy, and the human cost of conflict? 

Remember the Vedic story in which Indra defeats Vritra? Similarly to Indra, who united the heavenly army and led them into battle against demons of evil, Ukraine has united democratic forces in opposition to tyranny, authoritarianism, and neo-imperialism. 

Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally altered the architecture of European security. All the myths about security threats from the West or NATO against Russia have been dispelled by acts of aggression against an independent neighbouring state.

Putin seeks a repeat of the Yalta Conference of 1945 to divide spheres of infl uence between the world’s powers. Instead, he is destined to face a repeat of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, where Nazi criminals were convicted for preparing and executing invasions into other countries and committing other war crimes during World War II. The first step toward this has been taken. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an international arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, accusing him of the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainians, including children, to Russia. 

Of course, Russia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the ICC, but that will not hinder the pursuit of justice. Remember the case of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in modern history.

Three years into this war, initial assessments of Russian military dominance and Ukrainian vulnerability proved inaccurate. As a former military officer, what is your assessment of how this miscalculation impacted Ukraine’s strategy, and what key lessons can be learned from this war? 

The war has not changed Ukraine’s strategic course of becoming a full-fl edged member of the EU and NATO. On the contrary, the aggressive war unleashed by the Kremlin against Ukraine has only convinced all citizens of Ukraine, even those who previously had doubts, of the inevitability of the chosen strategic course. The example of historically neutral Finland and Sweden, which promptly joined the Alliance due to Moscow’s aggressive policies, further strengthens this confidence.

As a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, bilateral relations, both state-to-state and people-to-people, have been irreparably damaged for centuries to come. Russians will have to bear the weight of regret for generations for enabling Putin’s genocide against Ukrainians. 

What is the main lesson of this war? It might not have happened. If the international community had not watched with indifference the war Putin started in 2008 against Georgia, the occupation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, the brutal killing of civilians by Russian aviation in Syrian Aleppo, and the bloody atrocities of Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group in African countries.

Historical lessons must not be forgotten. Impunity only fuels the appetites of the aggressor. 

The shadow of the collapse of the USSR looms over Russia, but there is still little time to stop and punish the tyrant.